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ABSTRACT
During recent years, heightened standards for board audit commit-
tee membership have been imposed by the SEC, NYSE, and others.
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the audit committee will be comprised
solely of independent directors and that the company must disclose
whether at least one of the members of the audit committee is a "fi-
nancial expert" and if not, why not. An "audit committee financial
expert" is defined as a person who has the following attributes: (1) an
understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and finan-
cial statements; (2) the ability to assess the general application of such
principles in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals,
and reserves; (3) experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evalu-
ating financial statements that present a breadth and level of complex-
ity of accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth
and complexity of issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised
by the registrant's financial statements, or experience actively super-
vising one or more persons engaged in such activities; (4) an under-
standing of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting;
and (5) an understanding of audit committee functions.
Many seasoned audit committee chairmen hold the view that audit
committee financial experts should be experienced in performing fi-
nancial accounting functions themselves, rather than simply having
supervisory experience over the function. Indicative of this view is
that if accounting is the language of business, an audit committee fi-
nancial expert needs to fluently "speak GAAP and GAAS" to under-
stand the nuances of sophisticated and complex accounting, auditing,
internal controls, and SEC regulations.
Who then qualifies as a financial expert? This is a fact-dependent,
practical question that must be answered by every board, governance
and nominating committee, and audit committee member. My goal
here is to examine the technical requirements imposed by law and
regulation and to present thoughts as to best practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During recent years, heightened standards for board audit commit-
tee membership have been imposed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and
others.' In addition to the mandate that the committee members must
be independent, a requirement that the chairperson be a financial ex-
pert has been imposed.2 Who then qualifies as a financial expert?
Does supervisory experience over the accounting function, e.g. CEO
experience, really provide a sufficient understanding of accounting
theory and practice for qualification as an audit committee financial
expert (ACFE)? This is a fact-dependent, practical question that
must be answered by every board, governance and nominating com-
mittee, and audit committee member. My goal here is to examine the
technical requirements imposed by law and regulation and to present
thoughts as to best practice.
1I. ROLE OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
The audit committee serves as corporate governance gatekeeper to
the corporation's financial reporting. In his excellent landmark article
on corporate disclosure, Professor Henry T. C. Hu observes that
"[a]ccounting conventions and the particular accounting judgments a
corporation makes will significantly affect the depictions of reality
found in the corporation's financial statements."3 To the extent that
"such conventions and judgments result in depictions that depart from
the true economic state of affairs, and the investor is unable to reverse
1. See, e.g., Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
68 Fed. Reg. 5,110 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 249); Self-Regulatory
Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness
of Proposed Rule Change to the NASDAQ Listing Rules to Reflect Changes to the Rules of the
Commission, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,750 (June 17, 2009); Self-Regulatory Organizations; American
Stock Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed
Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto Modifying the Exchange's Independent Director
and Audit Committee Corporate Governance Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,201 (Dec. 8, 2006).
2. See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. at 5,110; Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change to the NASDAQ Listing Rules to
Reflect Changes to the Rules of the Commission, 74 Fed. Reg. at 28,750; Self-Regulatory Orga-
nizations; American Stock Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval to Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto Modifying the Exchange's
Independent Director and Audit Committee Corporate Governance Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. at
71,201.
3. Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, "Pure Information," and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1625 (2012).
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engineer his way to the objective reality, a serious disclosure problem
arises."4
A. Financial Complexity Increases
During recent years, as demonstrated by the 2008-2009 global fi-
nancial crisis, growth in technological capabilities and quantum ad-
vances in internet and computer technologies have changed the focus
of risk governance. Accordingly, "[m]odern financial innovation has
resulted in objective realities that are far more complex than in the
past, often beyond the capacity of the English language, accounting
terminology, visual display, risk measurement, and other tools on
which all depictions must primarily rely."5 Professor Hu, the SEC's
inaugural Director of the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial In-
novation (2009-2011), uses JPMorgan Chase's April 2012 derivatives
problem as an example:
[Sluch characteristics can be so complex that even "objective real-
ity" is subject to multiple meanings. Given such rudimentary tools
and such complex realities, the depictions may offer little more than
shadowy, gross outlines of the objective reality, however that reality
might be conceived.
... [E]ven a well-intentioned [issuer] either may not truly under-
stand or may not function as if he understands the reality he is
charged with depicting.
... Such [an issuer's] activities may be too complex relative to
existing depiction tools, and the activities and the organization of
the [issuer] itself may be so complex that the [issuer] may suffer
from both true misunderstandings and functional misunderstand-
ings of the objective reality it is in.6
What impact do increased technological complexity and newly-
minted financial instruments (intended to mitigate risk by hedging)
have on audit committee composition and requisite skills and experi-
ence? How do these needs and the demands of effective information
technology governance impact requirements for an audit committee's
financial expert(s)? I attempt to address these issues and other
considerations.
B. Role of the External Audit
Dennis Beresford says, "I believe [the external audit] is an integral
part of the system that shareholders and our overall capital markets
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1602.
6. Id.
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heavily rely on."7 Moreover, "Much of our democratic system is built
on checks and balances or 'trust but verify,' and the role of the exter-
nal audit brings an independent point of view to financial reporting
that helps make our public markets continue to be arguably the most
credible in the world."8 He continues:
I think it is also important to note that independence, objectivity,
and skepticism are qualities that audit committee members insist
upon in Chief Financial Officers, Controllers, Chief Accounting Of-
ficers, Chief Audit Executives, and other senior finance leaders with
whom they work directly. Obviously, these terms would not be ap-
plied in exactly the same way as for external auditors. A CFO, for
example, receives compensation from the company and wouldn't
meet an external auditor's definition of independence. However,
the audit committee expects that the CFO's communications to
them are independent of his/her personal interests in the company
or responsibilities to the CEO, for example. Providing incomplete
or incorrect information to the audit committee, or worse yet, with-
holding information, would be grounds for dismissal for a CFO.9
C. Audit Committee Mandate
While accounting and financial statement presentation may consti-
tute the language of business, it is the board's audit committee that
serves as the frontline integrity gatekeeper to the company's financial
statements. In its most recent Principles of Corporate Governance,10
the Business Roundtable's Fourth Principle states that management is
responsible "under the oversight of the audit committee and the
board, to produce financial statements that fairly present the financial
condition and results of operations of the corporation and to make the
timely disclosures investors need to assess the financial and business
soundness and risks of the corporation.""1 In its Fifth Principle, it
states that the board is responsible, "through its audit committee, to
7. Letter from Dennis R. Beresford, Ernst & Young Exec. Professor of Accounting, J.M. Tull
Sch. of Accounting at the Univ. of Ga., to the Office of the Sec'y of the PCAOB, 4 (Oct. 11,
2011), available at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/029_Dennis-R_Beresford.
pdf; see also Ronald C. Anderson et al., Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and
the Cost of Debt, 37 J. Accr. & EcoN. 315 (2004).
8. See Letter from Dennis R. Beresford, supra note 7, at 4.
9. Id.
10. Principles of Corporate Governance, Bus. ROUNDTABLE (2012), http://businessroundtable.
org/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/BRT Principles-of CorporateGovernance -2012
Formatted_Final.pdf; see Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 735 (2004).
11. Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at 2-3; see also Andrew J. Felo et al.,
Audit Committee Characteristics and the Perceived Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empiri-
cal Analysis (Apr. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:www.ssrn.com/abstract=
401240 (finding that the percentage of audit committee members having expertise in accounting
or financial management is positively related to financial reporting quality).
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engage an independent accounting firm to audit the financial state-
ments prepared by management and issue an opinion that those state-
ments are fairly stated in accordance with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles [(GAAP)], as well as to oversee the corpora-
tion's relationship with the outside auditor." 12
D. Chronology
It now seems difficult to believe that the presence and stature of the
formalized board audit committee have evolved so much over a rela-
tively few years. During the "early 1900s, no authoritative accounting
or auditing standards existed, and auditors wrote narrative audit re-
ports (free-form) for every company."' 3 "By the early 1920s, the nar-
rative auditor's report was reduced to one paragraph in length and
was referred to as an audit of the accounts and records whereby the
independent auditor would certify the balance sheet as being cor-
rect." 14 Moreover:
The auditor's report of 1934 was "the first report to have required as
opposed to suggested report wording." A[n] [SEC] investigation of
McKesson & Robbins resulted in the 1941 issuance of Accounting
Series Release No. 21. This release amended Regulation S-X ....
The AIA formally adopted the GAAS standards in 1948, which re-
sulted in several revisions to the auditor's report.
In 1979, based on recommendations from the Commission on Au-
ditor's Responsibilities ("Cohen Commission"), the AICPA's Au-
diting Standards Board ("ASB") analyzed the standard auditor's
report and concluded that "a substantial departure from the existing
report, as suggested by [the Cohen Commission] was not needed."
The Cohen Commission had specifically recommended expanding
the auditor's report to include a discussion about four distinct areas:
(1) financial statements, (2) other financial information (unaudited),(3) internal control, and (4) other matters (such as the company's
policy statement on employee conduct and meetings with the audit
committee). The Cohen Commission also recommended the audi-
12. Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at 3; see also Jonathan H. Grenier et
al., Enhancing Perceived and Actual Audit Committee Effectiveness Through Financial Expert
Certification, 6 CURRENT ISSUES IN AUDITING A15, A15-A16 (2012) (proposing that the SEC
initiate a CPE-driven certification program for audit committee members designated as financial
experts).
13. PCAOB Release No. 2011-003, Concept Release on Possible Revisions to PCAOB Stan-
dards Related to Reports on Audited Financial Statements and Related Amendments to
PCAOB Standards app. A-1 (2011) [hereinafter PCAOB Release No. 2011-003] (citing Marshall
A. Geiger, Setting the Standard for the New Auditor's Report: An Analysis of Attempts to Influ-
ence the Auditing Standards Board, in 1 STUDIES IN MANAGERIAL AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
38 (1993)), available at http://pcaobus.orgIRules/Rulemaking/Docket034/Concept Release.pdf.
14. Id. (quoting VINCENT M. O'REILLY ET AL., MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING 636 (11th ed.
1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tor describe those areas using a series of standardized alternative
phrases or paragraphs.' 5
As recently as thirty-something years ago, the audit committee was
in its infancy.16 Professor James D. Cox states, "Through most of the
1960s few companies had outside directors; the prevalence of outside
directors spread with the corporate governance movement of the
1970s so that having a majority of a public corporation's board be in-
dependent became something of a norm by the 1990s."17 During the
1980s, crisis brought regulation and a call for reforms. The Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) reports that "[a]s a
result of congressional hearings leading up to, and recommendations
from, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
("Treadway Commission"), a new paragraph, now commonly referred
to as the 'scope paragraph' was added to the auditor's report in the
1980s."18 The PCAOB continues:
The scope paragraph states the respective responsibilities of man-
agement and the independent auditor, describes the work per-
formed by the auditor, and indicates that sufficient evidence is
gathered to provide a reasonable basis for the auditor's opinion.
There have been no substantial changes to the required wording of
the standard auditor's report since the addition of the scope
paragraph.19
A study of 850 announcements of newly appointed outside directors
to audit committees during the period 1993-2002, before implementa-
tion of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), found "a significant and positive mar-
ket reaction to the announcement of new directors with accounting
financial expertise but no significant reaction to the announcement of
either nonaccounting financial experts or nonfinancial experts." 20
Moreover:
15. Id. at apps. A-1 to A-3 (footnotes omitted).
16. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman & James H. Hammond, Role of the Audit Committee:
Update and Implementation, NAT'L Ass'N OF CORP. DIRS., MONOGRAPH No. 13 (1980).
17. James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside
Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1077 (2003).
18. PCAOB Release No. 2011-003, supra note 13, at app. A-3. "The Treadway Commission
was established in response to the congressional and public scrutiny of the accounting profession
after significant business failures such as Drysdale Government Securities, Washington Public
Power Supply System, Baldwin-United Corp, and E.S.M. Government Securities. From October
1985 to September 1987, the Treadway Commission studied the financial reporting system in the
United States. The Treadway Commission's mission was to identify causal factors that can lead
to fraudulent financial reporting and steps to reduce its incidence." Id. at app. A-3 n.12 (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id. at app. A-3.
20. Mark L. DeFond et al., Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of
Boards of Directors?, 43 J. Accr. RES. 153, 158 (2005).
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[B]y finding a positive reaction to the appointment of accounting
financial experts . .. and finding no reaction to the appointment of
nonaccounting financial experts . .. our results are consistent with
accounting-based financial skills, but not broader financial skills,
improving the quality of the financial reporting environment. Fur-
thermore, by finding that the market reaction is confined to firms
with strong corporate governance, our results are also consistent
with financial expertise complementing strong governance .... 21
Just a few years before SOX, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt "identi-
fied problems regarding audit committee effectiveness." 2 2 As a result,
the NYSE and National Association of Securities Dealers jointly es-
tablished the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) on Audit Committee
Effectiveness in September 1998.23 Murphy Smith found that "imple-
mentation of the BRC recommendations have improved audit com-
mittee effectiveness." 24 Audit committees were found to be "more
likely to more seriously monitor management when they are actively
involved with reviews, meetings with internal and external auditors,
and when they are independent. Increasing the frequency of audit
committee meetings, the subject of [Smith's] study, is one step toward
more effective monitoring." 25 Smith observes that:
Perhaps the BRC was too little too late, and SOX would have been
necessary even if the BRC recommendations had been imple-
mented years earlier. Even after BRC and SOX, there will likely be
additional stories of failed companies and ineffective or uninformed
audit committees in the future, but perhaps they will be fewer than
without BRC or SOX.
The importance of this first step by the BRC should not be over-
looked as it forced board members to scrutinize performance, pre-
pare guidelines for action, and report actions to the stockholders. 26
E. Sarbanes-Oxley
It was the corporate financial fraud found in the cases of Enron,
Adelphia Communication, WorldCom, 27 and the like that led to "not
only a tightening of NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements with
21. Id. at 159.
22. L. Murphy Smith, Audit Committee Effectiveness: Did the Blue Ribbon Committee Recom-
mendations Make a Difference?, 3 INT'.L J. Accr., AUDITING & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
240, 240 (2006).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 249.
25. Id. at 249-50.
26. Id. at 250.
27. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Governance Failures at
Universal Banks During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The Cases of Enron and Worldcom
5 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 234, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952486.
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respect to independent directors, but also with the recent enactment
of SOX, which is the first step toward the federalization of corporate
governance norms for outside directors." 28 SOX legislation also re-
sulted in the strengthening of audit committee membership require-
ments of independence and heightened qualifications. Professors
Geoffrey C. Hazard and Edward B. Rock state that SOX "is impor-
tant not because it invents the role of independent director, but be-
cause it makes a variety of corporate functions mandatory and vastly
increases their legal complexity, and consequently enhances the re-
quirements of corporate judgment that can withstand question or
challenge." 29 Under SOX, it is the audit committee, according to Haz-
ard and Rock, which is subject to the most significant change.30 The
changes are as follows:
* The Audit Committee of a corporation subject to the new re-
gime will be comprised solely of independent directors. Moreo-
ver, the company must disclose whether at least one of the
members of the Audit Committee is a "financial expert" and if
not, why not.
* The Audit Committee statutorily will be "directly responsible
for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of
any registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer
(including resolution of disagreements between management
and the auditor regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of
preparing or issuing an audit report or related work, and each
such registered public accounting firm shall report directly to the
audit committee."
* The Audit Committee will have to "establish procedures for-
(A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received
by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls,
or auditing matters; and (B) the confidential, anonymous sub-
mission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding ques-
tionable accounting or auditing matters."
* The Audit Committee will have to pre-approve audit and per-
missible non-audit services.
* The Audit Committee must have a "charter that addresses a list"
of specified duties, responsibilities and purposes, one of which
must be to "assist board oversight of (1) the integrity of the com-
28. Cox, supra note 17, at 1078. "With respect to federalization of corporate governance,
consider section 301 of the Act which calls for an independent audit committee, specifies duties
for the audit committee, notably the appointment, compensation and termination of the firm's
outside accountant and requires that the audit committee have resources to engage such experts
as it needs to discharge its duties." Id. at 1078 n.4.
29. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The Emer-
gence of the Independent Directors' Counsel, 59 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1393 (2004).
30. Id.; see also Gopal V. Krishnan & Gnanakumar Visvanathan, Reporting Internal Control
Deficiencies in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Era: The Role of Auditors and Corporate Governance,
11 INT'L J. AuDrrNG 73, 75 (2007).
214 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 11:205
pany's financial statements [and] (2) the company's compliance
with legal and regulatory requirements . . . ."
* Part of the Audit Committee's responsibility is to monitor and
ensure that the audit engagement team not overstay its permissi-
ble term. The term limit is five years on, five years off for the
audit partner, and no member of the audit team may accept a
financial reporting job with the issuer without first observing a
one year cooling off period.
* The Audit Committee must also monitor audit partner compen-
sation to ensure that the audit partner does not get paid based
on non-audit services provided to the issuer.
* The Audit Committee will have the authority to engage indepen-
dent counsel and other advisers it deems necessary, at company
expense.3'
Moreover, SOX "may require the audit committee to be in regular,
sometimes continuous, communication with the outside auditors, and
members may expect the committee to be at times as a practical mat-
ter in continuous session." 32 As Hazard and Rock observe:
[A]dditional duties devolve on the Audit Committee as derivative
from the increased obligations on other actors. Thus, for example,
the CEO and CFO must certify that they have disclosed to the Au-
dit Committee (A) all significant deficiencies in the design or opera-
tion of internal controls which could adversely affect the issuer's
ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial data and
. . . (B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves manage-
ment or other employees who have a significant role in the issuer's
internal controls.33
Lawrence E. Mitchell observes that SOX "makes three specific
changes in the way we think about corporate governance: first, it
brings into the realm of internal governance the gatekeepers that once
stood outside the box, including auditors, analysts and lawyers." 34
Second, Mitchell writes that "it significantly enhances the legal status
of, and centrality of corporate governance to, the chief executive of-
ficer and the audit committee, two constituents that have received
very little recognition in the law and its literature."35 Third, Mitchell
states:
[B]oth in doing this and in other respects (like the prohibition of
loans to officers and certain other conflict of interest transactions),
it federalizes an important dimension of the internal laws of corpo-
31. Hazard & Rock, supra note 29, at 1393-94 (footnotes omitted).
32. Id. at 1394 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. (quoting Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302(a)(5)(A)-(B), 116
Stat. 745, 777 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Govern-
ance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2003).
35. Id.
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rate governance, creating a new (albeit arguably narrow) duty of
care for the CEO and audit committee and reintroducing serious
prohibitions on conflict of interest transactions that have eroded to
nothingness in the hands of the Delaware judiciary and
legislature.36
F. Charter Requirement
We have already seen that the audit committee must have a "char-
ter that addresses a list of specified duties, responsibilities and pur-
poses, one of which must be to assist board oversight of (1) the
integrity of the company's financial statements . . . [and] (2) the com-
pany's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements." 3 7 Section
121B of the American Stock Exchange Company Guide specifies the
following requirements for an audit committee charter:
Each [I]issuer must certify that it has adopted a formal written
audit committee charter and that the [A]audit [C]committee has re-
viewed and reassessed the adequacy of the formal written charter
on an annual basis. The charter must specify the following:
[(i)](a) the scope of the audit committee's responsibilities, and
how it carries out those responsibilities, including structure,
processes, and membership requirements;
[(ii)](b) the audit committee's responsibility for ensuring its re-
ceipt from the outside auditors of a formal written statement de-
lineating all relationships between the auditor and the [company]
issuer, consistent with Independence Standards Board Standard 1,
and the audit committee's responsibility for actively engaging in a
dialogue with the auditor with respect to any disclosed relationships
or services that may impact the objectivity and independence of the
auditor and for taking, or recommending that the full board take,
appropriate action to oversee the independence of the outside audi-
tor; [and]
[(iii)](c) the audit committee's purpose of overseeing the account-
ing and financial reporting processes of the issuer and the audits of
the financial statements of the issuer; and
[(iv)](d) the specific audit committee responsibilities and author-
ity set forth in [paragraph (4) of this subs]Section 121B(4).38
36. Id. at 1189-90.
37. Hazard & Rock, supra note 29, at 1393-94 (quoting NYSE Euronext, Inc., NYSE Listed
Company Manual § 303A.07(b)(i)(A) (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Self-Regulatory Organizations; American Stock Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Or-
der Granting Accelerated Approval to Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto
Modifying the Exchange's Independent Director and Audit Committee Corporate Governance
Standards, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,201, 71,202 (Dec. 8, 2006). An example audit committee charter is
provided by ExxonMobil, as adopted by its board of directors. Audit Committee Charter, Exx-
ONMOIL (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/investor-governance-comm-
audit.aspx.
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III. THE "INDEPENDENCE" REQUIREMENTS
The audit committee's role in monitoring and avoiding conflicts of
interest and independence is provided by Title II of SOX.39 Lawrence
E. Mitchell observes, "[M]ost interesting for the link between ac-
counting reform and the federalization of corporate governance is the
manner in which Title III, the Corporate Responsibility portion of the
Act, links accounting reform with the internal affairs of the corpora-
tion." 40 He states:
[E]very listed corporation is required either to have an audit com-
mittee composed solely of independent directors or to treat the
board as a whole as the audit committee. Two things about the cor-
porate governance aspect of this requirement are notable. First, the
Act specifies not only the composition of the audit committee but
also the procedures by which the audit committee is to operate, re-
quiring each corporation to provide "appropriate funding" for its
audit committee and requiring that the audit committee establish
procedures for "the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints
received by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting
controls, or auditing matters; and the confidential, anonymous sub-
mission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questiona-
ble accounting or auditing matters." While the Act does not specify
the exact procedures the audit committee is to adopt, the fact that it
specifies the nature of the procedures, including the very substan-
tive one of establishing whistle-blowing chains, goes far toward set-
ting a standard of care that seems already to be substantially in
excess of that required generally by state corporate law.
Moreover, the Act not only requires that the audit committee
consist of independent directors, but it also defines the meaning of
independence, a definition heretofore left to state law, and in a
more rigorous way than does, for example, Delaware or New York.
The Act defines "independent" as a director who may not "accept
any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer;
or be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof."
Both Delaware and New York, at least for some purposes (deriva-
tive suit dismissal, for example) have less stringent requirements for
independence. In this respect, the Act can be said to have estab-
lished a higher duty of loyalty for public corporations than currently
exists under state law. At a minimum, it federalizes the definition
of independent director for general purposes.41
The SEC's proposed rule would have required disclosure by a com-
pany as to whether or not "its [ACFE] is independent of manage-
39. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 1198.
40. Id.; see also April Klein, Causes and Consequences of Variations in Audit Committee Com-
position (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-00-002, 2000), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=221779.
41. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 1198-99 (footnotes omitted).
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ment." 42 The SEC received many comments from the public opposed
to this disclosure requirement "as unnecessary, noting that Section
301 of [SOX] mandates the [SEC] to direct the self-regulatory organi-
zations to prohibit the listing of any company that does not require all
of its audit committee members to be independent." 4 3 The SEC ob-
served, however, that "not all Exchange Act reporting companies are
listed on a national securities exchange or association."44 The SEC
explained, "We believe that investors in these companies would be
interested in knowing whether the [ACFE] is independent of manage-
ment. Therefore, the final rules require a company to disclose
whether the person or persons identified as the [ACFE] is indepen-
dent of management." 45
The proposing release also defined "independent" by reference to
section 1OA(m)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act).46 The SEC received several comments concerned "that this ref-
erence may cause some confusion because the securities laws include
different definitions of the term 'affiliated,' which is part of the defini-
tion used in [s]ection 1OA(m)(3). Therefore, to provide clarity, the
final rules refer to the definition of 'independent' used in Item
7(d)(3)(iv) of Schedule 14A." 47 Therefore, the SEC believes this revi-
sion ensures the consistent use of the term "independent."
The concept of actual and true independence is still argued. For
example, Professors Carcello, Neal, Palmrose, and Scholtz remark
that these various regulatory attempts to require independence fail to
"consider the CEO's myriad personal connections. So, the CEO's in-
fluence can still be exerted through directors who appear indepen-
dent, but are not independent in fact, if such directors can obtain
board membership. One way for this to occur is through CEO in-
volvement in the board selection process." 48 Moreover, "Bilimoria
and Piderit . . . find that directors are more likely to be appointed to
42. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 5,110, 5,112 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 249).
43. Id.
44. Id. (noting that only 7,250 listed companies of approximately 17,000 listing companies are
in SEC Release No. 33-8173).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 5,112 (footnote omitted).
48. Joseph V. Carcello et al., CEO Involvement in Selecting Board Members, Audit Committee
Effectiveness, and Restatements, 28 CoNTEMP. Accr. RES. 396, 396 (2009).
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the nominating committee if they have social ties to the CEO or if
their demographic profiles match those of top managers." 49
A. NYSE Requirements
The NYSE rules require that the company have a majority of inde-
pendent directors. The rules provide that no director will qualify as
"independent" unless the board affirmatively determines that the di-
rector has no material relationship with the company and its subsidiar-
ies, either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an
organization that has a relationship with the company. In evaluating
each director's independence, the board considers the NYSE rules as
well as all facts and circumstances deemed relevant.
The board, in its business judgment, must determine if the audit
committee members are independent, as required by applicable listing
standards of the NYSE governing the qualifications of the members of
audit committees, including the requirements of the Exchange Act.
The function of the audit committee is to assist the board in fulfilling
its responsibility to oversee (1) management's conduct of the com-
pany's financial reporting process (including management's develop-
ment and maintenance of systems of internal accounting and financial
controls), (2) the integrity of the company's financial statements,
(3) the company's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements
and ethical standards, (4) the qualifications and independence of the
company's outside auditors, and (5) the performance of the com-
pany's internal audit function and the outside auditors; and to prepare
the audit committee report required by the rules of the SEC to be
included in the company's annual proxy statement.
B. Qualification Questionnaire Process
Section 303A.02 (Independence Tests) of the NYSE Listed Com-
pany Manual outlines the requirements for a director to be deemed
independent by the NYSE, including the mandate that any board af-
firmatively determine that a director has no material relationship with
the company that would impair independence. To assist in ascertain-
ing the independence of board members, each board member typi-
cally completes a qualification questionnaire. Board members are
asked to verify biographical information, service on other company
boards and committees, and attendance history at board and commit-
tee meetings. They are also asked to affirm compliance with all of the
49. Id. at 424 (citing D. Bilimoria & S.K. Piderit, Board Committee Membership: Effects of
Sex-Based Bias, 37 ACAD. MVGrT. J. 1453-78 (1994)).
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independence standards set forth in the NYSE Listed Company Man-
ual and Company Board of Directors' Guidelines. Further, board
members are asked to verify their future interest in serving on the
board and their availability and capability to serve, as well as confirm
they meet additional qualifications required for continued service, as
outlined in its Board of Directors' Guidelines.50
After receipt of all completed qualification questionnaires, typically
the governance and nomination committee members receive a copy of
each questionnaire, along with information regarding each board
member's ownership in company equity securities. At the conclusion
of this process, the board will affirmatively determine that no director,
with the exception of a CEO or other employee or family member
who is also a director, has a material relationship with the company
that would impair her independence and that each director meets all
of the independence requirements set forth in the NYSE Listed Com-
pany Manual and Board of Directors' Guidelines. Having completed
this process, the company is in the position to attest that its board is
comprised of a majority of independent directors, as required in sec-
tion 303A.01 (Independent Directors Section) of the NYSE Listed
Company Manual.51
C. NASDAQ Listing Standards: Director Independence
The NASDAQ Stock Market's listing standards have required that
a majority of the members of a board must qualify as independent, as
affirmatively determined by the full board. Company corporate gov-
ernance guidelines may impose additional independence criteria and
state that board membership will be predominantly non-employee di-
rectors who, at a minimum, meet the criteria for independence re-
quired by NASDAQ. Based on a review of a director's professional
and personal affiliations, the board will determine if each, except of-
ficers such as a president and chief executive officer or other officers,
is an independent director, as defined in the applicable rules for NAS-
DAQ listed companies and the additional standards set forth in the
NASDAQ Company Corporate Governance Guidelines. 52 Effective
May 2012, NASDAQ "introduced two new guides, designed to pro-
50. See NYSE Euronext, Inc., NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.00 (2012).
51. Id. § 303A.01.
52. During May 2012, NASDAQ introduced two new replacement guides: Initial Listing
Guide and Continuing Listing Guide. See NASDAO OMX Grp. Inc., Initial Listing Guide
(2013), available at https://listingcenter.nasdaqomx.com/assets/initialguide.pdf; NASDAQ OMX
Grp., Inc., Continued Listing Guide (2013), available at https://listingcenter.nasdaqomx.com/
assets/continuedguide.pdf. See generally NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc., Summary of NASDAQ
Corporate Governance Proposals (2002), available at http://community.corporatecompliance.
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vide companies and their advisors with a practical guide to being listed
on NASDAQ, including important information about listing stan-
dards, disclosure and notification requirements and fees."53 Informa-
tion, in relevant part, regarding the definition of "Independent
Director" is reprinted as follows:
5605. Board of Directors and Committees
(a) Definitions
(1) "Executive Officer" means those officers covered in Rule 16a-
1(f) under the Act.
(2) "Independent Director" means a person other than an Execu-
tive Officer or employee of the Company or any other individual
having a relationship which, in the opinion of the Company's board
of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judg-
ment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director. For purposes
of this rule, "Family Member" means a person's spouse, parents,
children and siblings, whether by blood, marriage or adoption, or
anyone residing in such person's home. The following persons shall
not be considered independent:
(A) a director who is, or at any time during the past three years was,
employed by the Company;
(B) a director who accepted or who has a Family Member who ac-
cepted any compensation from the Company in excess of $120,000
during any period of twelve consecutive months within the three
years preceding the determination of independence, other than the
following:
(i) compensation for board or board committee service;
(ii) compensation paid to a Family Member who is an employee
(other than an Executive Officer) of the Company; or
(iii) benefits under a tax-qualified retirement plan, or non-discre-
tionary compensation.
Provided, however, that in addition to the requirements contained
in this paragraph (B), audit committee members are also subject to
additional, more stringent requirements under Rule 5605(c)(2).
(C) a director who is a Family Member of an individual who is, or at
any time during the past three years was, employed by the Com-
pany as an Executive Officer;
(D) a director who is, or has a Family Member who is, a partner in,
or a controlling Shareholder or an Executive Officer of, any organi-
zation to which the Company made, or from which the Company
received, payments for property or services in the current or any of
the past three fiscal years that exceed 5% of the recipient's consoli-
dated gross revenues for that year, or $200,000, whichever is more,
other than the following:
org/CORPORATECOMPLIANCE/Communities/Resources/ViewDocument/?DocumentKey=
62dfce86-d3fc-4f5d-b39d-3fa068503b04.
53. NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc., NASDAQ Regulatory Requirements and Listing Standards
and Fees (2012), available at https://listingcenter.nasdaqomx.com/assets/RegRequirements.pdf.
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(i) payments arising solely from investments in the Company's se-
curities; or
(ii) payments under non-discretionary charitable contribution
matching programs.
(E) a director of the Company who is, or has a Family Member who
is, employed as an Executive Officer of another entity where at any
time during the past three years any of the Executive Officers of the
Company serve on the compensation committee of such other en-
tity; or
(F) a director who is, or has a Family Member who is, a current
partner of the Company's outside auditor, or was a partner or em-
ployee of the Company's outside auditor who worked on the Com-
pany's audit at any time during any of the past three years.
(G) in the case of an investment company, in lieu of paragraphs
(A)-(F), a director who is an "interested person" of the Company
as defined in Section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act of
1940, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the board of
directors or any board committee. 54
IV. THE FINANCIAL EXPERT
Whether any particular individual qualifies as a financial expert will
require a factual determination by the board based on the person's
education, training, and actual relevant experience with respect to the
criteria set forth by the SEC.55
A. SEC Regulations and Definitions
The board of directors must determine whether any given director
meets the qualification guidelines as an ACFE as such term is defined
in Item 407(d)(5)(ii) of Regulation S-K promulgated by the SEC.56
54. NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc., NASDAQ Stock Market Rules § 5605 (2013).
55. See generally Joseph V. Carcello & Terry L. Neal, Audit Committee Composition and Au-
ditor Reporting, 75 Accr. REv. 453 (2000); Jeffrey R. Cohen et al., Corporate Governance in the
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Era: Auditors' Experiences, 27 CONTEMP. Accr. RES. 751 (2010); Law-
rence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the Empirical Liter-
ature, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 465 (2008); Mark L. DeFond et al., supra note 20; April Klein, Audit
Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management, 33 J. Accr. & ECON.
375 (2002); Jagan Krishnan & Jong Eun Lee, Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Litigation
Risk, and Corporate Governance, 28 AUDrrING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 241 (2009); Gopal V.
Krishnan & Gnanakumar Visvanathan, Do Auditors Price Audit Committee's Expertise? The
Case of Accounting Versus Nonaccounting Financial Experts, 24 J. Accr., AUDITING & FIN. 115
(2009); Gopal V. Krishnan & Gnanakumar Visvanathan, Does the SOX Definition of an Ac-
counting Expert Matter? The Association Between Audit Committee Directors' Accounting Ex-
pertise and Accounting Conservatism, 25 CONTEMP. Accr. REs. 827 (2008); Scott Duellman et
al., Audit Committee Financial Experts and Insider Trading (Jan. 4, 2011) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.isarhq.org/papers/PS-02_Duellman-GuoZhangZhouISAR
2011.pdf.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(5)(ii) (2012); see Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg.
68,334, 68,364 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239-40, 249, 274).
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SOX fails to explicitly specify who at the company should determine
whether a particular individual meets qualification standards as a fi-
nancial expert. However, the SEC states, "We believe that the board
of directors in its entirety, as the most broad-based body within the
company, is best-equipped to make the determination. We think that
it is appropriate that any such determination will be subject to rele-
vant state law principles such as the business judgment rule."57 Ac-
cordingly, an ACFE is defined as a person who has the following
attributes:
(1) An understanding of [GAAP] and financial statements;
(2) Experience applying [GAAP] in connection with the accounting
for estimates, accruals, and reserves that are generally compara-
ble to the estimates, accruals and reserves, if any, used in the
registrant's financial statements;
(3) Experience preparing or auditing financial statements that pre-
sent accounting issues that are generally comparable to those
raised by the registrant's financial statements;
(4) Experience with internal controls and procedures for financial
reporting; and
(5) An understanding of audit committee functions.58
The SEC initially requires that "an individual will have to possess
all of the attributes listed in the above definition to qualify as an
[ACFE]."59 Following numerous industry practitioner comments, the
SEC decided to eliminate "the proposed requirement that a person's
experience applying [GAAP] in connection with accounting for esti-
mates, accruals and reserves be 'generally comparable' to the esti-
mates, accruals and reserves used in the registrant's financial
statements." 60
Under the final rules, the SEC states:
[A] person must have acquired such attributes through any one or
more of the following:
(1) Education and experience as a principal financial officer, princi-
pal accounting officer, controller, public accountant or auditor
or experience in one or more positions that involve the per-
formance of similar functions;
57. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 5,110, 5,117 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 249).
58. Id. at 5,112; see also Item 16A(b) of Form 20-F; Paragraph 8(b) of General Instruction B
to Form 40-F.
59. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adopts Rules on Provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-
134.htm.
60. Id.
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(2) Experience actively supervising a principal financial officer,
principal accounting officer, controller, public accountant, audi-
tor or person performing similar functions;
(3) Experience overseeing or assessing the performance of compa-
nies or public accountants with respect to the preparation, au-
diting or evaluation of financial statements; or
(4) Other relevant experience.61
B. Integrity
As is the case for audit committee members and company directors
generally, no other factor is as determinative to the likelihood of
board governance success as the presence of a director's personal in-
tegrity. The SEC addressed this issue:
The fact that a person previously has served on an audit committee
does not, by itself, justify the board of directors in "grandfathering"
that person as an [ACFE] under the definition. Similarly, the fact
that a person has experience as a public accountant or auditor, or a
principal financial officer, controller or principal accounting officer
or experience in a similar position does not, by itself, justify the
board of directors in deeming the person to be an [ACFE]. In addi-
tion to determining that a person possesses an appropriate degree
of knowledge and experience, the board must ensure that it names
an [ACFE] who embodies the highest standards of personal and
professional integrity. In this regard, a board should consider any
disciplinary actions to which a potential expert is, or has been, sub-
ject in determining whether that person would be a suitable
[ACFE]. 62
Veteran audit committee chairman Philip McCormick states, "I've
always believed that personal integrity is the most valuable asset I
have-I'm going to do the right thing; my personal integrity is not for
sale. Experience has taught me that many human relations issues are
wrapped up in integrity and it's a complex subject." 63 McCormick
continues, "The audit trail for assessing integrity includes looking at a
person's work history, examining their prior business associations
[and] failed businesses, and any prior questionable financial reporting
by any business where he or she has been associated." 64
61. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 5,113-14; see also Item 401(h)(3) of Regulation S-K; Item 401(e)(3) of Regulation S-B;
Item 16A(c) of Form 20-F; Paragraph 8(c) of General Instruction B to Form 40-F.
62. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 5,116.
63. Telephone Interview with Philip McCormick, professional corporate director and veteran
audit committee chairman (Jan. 24, 2012).
64. Id.
2013] 223
224 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:205
C. Company- and Industry-Specific Knowledge
Certain industries present unusually complex accounting and valua-
tion challenges that require an enhanced understanding of and experi-
ence with accounting theory and audit practice. 65 In particular, the
insurance, energy, and banking industries come to mind as useful ex-
amples of where specialized expertise and experience with complex,
technical audit issues may prove helpful.
1. Insurance
An audit committee chairman, i.e. a financial expert, of an insur-
ance company will need to be familiar with and have experience un-
derstanding the various nuances of insurance accounting concepts
such as (1) accounting for cessions, (2) claims incurred, (3) earned
premiums, (4) investment accounting, (5) loss ratios, (6) outstanding
claims, (7) policy acquisition costs, (8) reinsurance treaties, (9) risk-
based capital, (10) solvency margin, and (11) provision for unearned
premiums. The methods for calculating these may seem a mystery to
the inexperienced. 66
2. Energy: Exploration and Production
An energy exploration and production audit committee chairman
will need to be familiar with petroleum reservoir dynamics, the con-
cept of expected production decline curves for a given formation, and
all those myriad factors that comprise elements of valuation in the
petroleum industry. A vivid example of why this is important may be
found in the case of one of the world's largest energy companies by
any measure, Royal Dutch Shell. On January 9, 2004, Shell "an-
nounced that it would have to reduce its 'proved' oil and gas reserves
by 3.9 billion barrels, from 19.5 billion barrels down to 15.6 billion
65. See Baruch Lev, Remarks on the Measurement, Valuation, and Reporting of Intangible
Assets, 9 FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV. 17, 19 (2003).
66. See Guy Simonet, Insurance Accounting Principles, in INSURANCE AND PRIVATE PENSIONS
COMPENDIUM FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and De-
velopment 2000); see also Karen K. Nelson, The Discretionary Use of Present Value-Based Mea-
surements by Property-Casualty Insurers (Jan. 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://gsbapps.stanford.edulresearchpapers/library/rpl428r2.pdf. See generally J. DAVID CUM-
MINS ET AL., CYCLES AND CRISES IN PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE: CAUSES AND IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (Scott E. Harrington & Robert W. Klein eds., 1991); Martin F. Grace
& J. Tyler Leverty, Political Cost Incentives for Managing the Property-Liability Insurer Loss
Reserve, 48 J. Accr. REs. 21 (2010); Douglas 0. Cook & J. David Cummins, Productivity and
Efficiency in Insurance: An Overview of the Issues (Oct. 11, 1994) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2150.
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barrels . . . represent[ing] 20% of the Companies' proved reserves." 67
Additionally:
The oil portion of the write-down alone, about two-thirds of the
revision, represented $135 billion in potential future revenue, as-
suming moderate oil prices of $50 a barrel. The restatement related
mainly to reserves booked from 1996 to 2002.
Shell was forced to cut its reserves three times in the months fol-
lowing the initial January 9, 2004 announcement. On March 18,
2004, Shell announced (1) that the equivalent of 250 million barrels
of oil were being reclassified because they did not comply with SEC
regulations and (2) that another 220 million barrels of oil equivalent
would not be included in the Companies' reported proved reserves
for the year ended 2003. On April 9, 2004, Shell cut its reserves by
an additional 300 million barrels. On May 24, 2004, the Companies
downgraded the size of their proved oil and gas reserves by 103 mil-
lion barrels. On February 3, 2005, Shell announced yet again that it
would have to restate its proved reserves, stating that it was remov-
ing from reserves 1.37 million barrels of oil equivalent of oil and gas
that were reported as at December 31, 2003. In total, Shell has re-
duced its previously-reported proved reserves by approximately 6
billion barrels.
In addition to reducing its previously-reported proved reserves,
Shell has twice restated its financial results for 2001 and 2002 and
once restated its financial results for 2003. The restatements have
significantly impacted the Companies' financial results. The first fi-
nancial restatement, announced on April 19, 2004, caused decreases
to net income of $42 million for 2001 and $108 million for 2002. The
second financial restatement, announced on February 3, 2005,
caused decreases to net income of $49 million for 2001, $66 million
for 2002 and $189 million for 2003.68
"It's an imperfect world," notes audit committee chairman Phil Mc-
Cormick;69 "[SOX] says that we must have processes that can be repli-
cated. In a smaller E&P [exploration and production] company
setting, we can derive comfort from an outside petroleum engineering
firm's estimate of reserves."70 Moreover, "[t]he practice of following
the assumptions over the years of a highly regarded petroleum engi-
neering firm-allows for a reasonable assessment that the engineering
firm is acting responsibly, thereby providing comfort that stated
reserves can be relied upon as a fair reflection of what the company
67. See Case History, SHELLSETrLEMENT.COM, http://www.shellsettlement.com/index.php?
page=history (last visited Mar. 6,2013). See generally David F. Larcker et al., Royal Dutch/Shell:
A Shell Game with Oil Reserves (A) (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus. 2009).
68. Case History, supra note 67.
69. Telephone Interview with Philip McCormick, supra note 63.
70. Id.
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may actually produce."7 ' McCormick continues, "Although maybe
not required by the rules, in my opinion a 'financial expert' in an E&P
setting should have an understanding of the processes and concepts
involved in reserve engineering at the thirty-thousand foot level so
that you know what you don't know." 72 Then, "a financial expert
should have the intelligence to ask probing questions designed to as-
sess the integrity of the process."73
3. Banking
Professor Hu uses the April-May 2012 example of JPMorgan
Chase's derivative problem to vividly illustrate how financial misun-
derstandings require, or may defy, sophisticated knowledge and audit
committee leadership and expertise. Accordingly, "[s]tructural factors
could cause even the most sophisticated of financial institutions to
truly misunderstand or functionally misunderstand the complex finan-
cial innovations in which they were involved." 74
JPM is among the most sophisticated financial institutions in the
world. In September 2008, at the height of the [global financial cri-
sis], Fortune Magazine celebrated JPM's commanding position as
last bank standing and emphasized how Dimon and his trusted team
of talented lieutenants shared a zeal for sifting piles of data to spot
trouble before it happens and vigilantly control risk, even when that
means sacrificing growth and losing market share to rivals. Dimon
and JPM were so respected that they were at the vanguard of the
financial services industry to fend off the impact of Dodd-Frank.
JPM appears to have suffered from both true misunderstandings
and functional misunderstandings of the objective reality of the de-
rivatives activities it was engaged in.
In terms of true misunderstandings, as a purely technical matter,
JPM was mistaken as to at least three issues: first, the core model
that JPM used in measuring risk exposures; second, the general
methodology for gauging possible risk exposures; and third, its




74. See Hu, supra note 3, at 1671; see also Anette Mikes, Risk Management at Crunch Time:
Are Chief Risk Officers Compliance Champions or Business Partners? (May 30, 2008) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1138615.
75. Hu, supra note 3, at 1671-72 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Michel Benaroch & Vasant Dhar, An Intelligent Assistant for Financial Hedging (Ctr. for
Digital Econ. Research, Working Paper No. IS-91-33, 1992), available at http://archive.nyu.edu/
bitstreami/2451/14391/1/IS-91-33.pdf (observing that problems in finance, particularly those in-
volving risk assessment and management, have been slow to yield to expert technology because
the knowledge involved, such as that about financial instruments, is constantly changing, making
it difficult to keep a rules base accurate).
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D. Safe Harbor Provisions
A threshold question surrounding designation as an ACFE is
whether such designation will increase "or decrease his or her duties,
obligations or potential liability as an audit committee member."76
While a few commentators to the proposed rule "recommended a for-
mal safe harbor from liability for [ACFEs]," the SEC in its final rule
noted, "Unlike the provisions of the Act that impose substantive re-
quirements,77 the requirements contemplated by Section 407 are en-
tirely disclosure-based." 78 Moreover, "We find no support in [SOX]
or in related legislative history that Congress intended to change the
duties, obligations or liability of any audit committee member, includ-
ing the [ACFE], through this provision." 79 In addition, the SEC states
in its final rule:
In the proposing release, we stated that we did not believe that
the mere designation of the [ACFE] would impose a higher degree
of individual responsibility or obligation on that person. Nor did we
intend for the designation to decrease the duties and obligations of
other audit committee members or the board of directors.
We continue to believe that it would adversely affect the opera-
tion of the audit committee and its vital role in our financial report-
ing and public disclosure system, and systems of corporate
governance more generally, if courts were to conclude that the des-
ignation and public identification of an [ACFE] affected such per-
son's duties, obligations or liability as an audit committee member
or board member. We find that it would be adverse to the interests
of investors and to the operation of markets and therefore would
not be in the public interest, if the designation and identification
affected the duties, obligations or liabilities to which any member of
the company's audit committee or board is subject. To codify this
position, we are including a safe harbor in the new audit committee
disclosure item to clarify that:
* A person who is determined to be an [ACFE] will not be
deemed an "expert" for any purpose, including without limita-
tion for purposes of Section 11 of the Securities Act, as a result
of being designated or identified as an [ACFE] pursuant to the
new disclosure item;
76. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 5,110, 5,116 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 249).
77. Id. "For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the Commission to direct the self-
regulatory organizations by rule to mandate the independence of all audit committee members
of companies listed on national securities exchanges and associations. As another example, Sec-
tion 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits certain loans made by companies to their directors
and executive officers." Id. at 5,116 n.34 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 5,116.
79. Id.
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* The designation or identification of a person as an [ACFE] pur-
suant to the new disclosure item does not impose on such person
any duties, obligations or liability that are greater than the du-
ties, obligations and liability imposed on such person as a mem-
ber of the audit committee and board of directors in the absence
of such designation or identification; and
* The designation or identification of a person as an [ACFE] pur-
suant to the new disclosure item does not affect the duties, obli-
gations or liability of any other member of the audit committee
or board of directors.80
This safe harbor clarifies that any information in a registration
statement reviewed by the [ACFE] is not "expertised" unless such
person is acting in the capacity of some other type of traditionally
recognized expert. Similarly, because the [ACFE] is not an expert
for purposes of Section 11, he or she is not subject to a higher level
of due diligence with respect to any portion of the registration state-
ment as a result of his or her designation or identification as an
[ACFE].
In adopting this safe harbor, we wish to emphasize that all direc-
tors bear significant responsibility. State law generally imposes a
fiduciary duty upon directors to protect the interests of a company's
shareholders. This duty requires a director to inform himself or her-
self of relevant facts and to use a "critical eye" in assessing informa-
tion prior to acting on a matter. Our new rule provides that
whether a person is, or is not, an [ACFE] does not alter his or her
duties, obligations or liabilities. We believe this should be the case
under federal and state law.81
V. ARE A CPA AND PUBLIC COMPANY AUDIT
EXPERIENCE REQUIRED?
A. Background
"When the SEC initially proposed those rules [about who qualifies
as an ACFE] pursuant to [SOX], they were met with significant oppo-
sition," says Dennis Beresford.82 As the SEC sought comments to its
proposed disclosures required by sections 406 and 407 of SOX, the
SEC noted that many comments received criticized specific provisions
of the proposed financial expert definition as being too narrow. In
particular, many commenters asserted that the SEC's proposed re-
quirement that an expert have direct experience preparing or auditing
80. "Although other audit committee members may look to the [ACFE] as a resource on
certain issues that arise, audit committee members should work together to perform the commit-
tee's responsibilities. The safe harbor provides that other audit committee members may not
abdicate their responsibilities." Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 5,117 n.36.
81. Id. at 5,116-17 (footnotes omitted).
82. Letter from Dennis R. Beresford, supra note 7, at 12.
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financial statements was greatly, and needlessly, restrictive. Other
commenters were concerned that the requirement that a person has
had experience with financial statements presenting issues generally
comparable to those raised by the company's financial statements
might have anti-competitive effects if the SEC interpreted this re-
quirement to mean that a financial expert would need previous expe-
rience with financial statements of other companies in the same
industry.83
B. The Accounting and Auditing Supervision Controversy
Item (iii) of the proposed rule specified that the financial expert
must have "experience preparing or auditing financial statements that
present accounting issues that are generally comparable to those
raised by the registrant's financial statements."8 "The result was very
watered down final rules that allow individuals who served in senior
executive positions to qualify even when they have very little actual
accounting or auditing experience," says Beresford.85
"I've long been an advocate of strengthening the [ACFE] require-
ments because I think they don't provide for sufficient understanding
of accounting and auditing matters in many cases," observes Beres-
ford, who also serves on the board of directors of the National Associ-
ation of Corporate Directors and is a member of the PCAOB's
Standing Advisory Group.86
In particular, I'm concerned that the rules allow former CEOs and
others who have supervised finance functions but not performed
them themselves to qualify as ACFEs. While some of these individ-
uals are outstanding audit committee members, others simply don't
speak GAAP and GAAS sufficiently to understand the nuances of
complex and sophisticated accounting, auditing, internal controls,
SEC regulations, etc. to be fully effective audit committee members,
let alone experts.87
Beresford elsewhere observed that this "relatively specific knowl-
edge of GAAP, SEG accounting regulations, and auditing standards
. .. should be current."88 Therefore, "a retired financial executive or
83. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 5,116-17.
84. Id. at 5,114.
85. Letter from Dennis R. Beresford, supra note 7, at 12.
86. E-mail from Dennis R. Beresford, Ernst & Young Exec. Professor of Accounting, J.M.
Tull Sch. of Accounting at the Univ. of Ga. (Feb. 6, 2012, 8:08 CST) (on file with author) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id.
88. Dennis R. Beresford & Joseph Hinsey, How 'Expert' Is Your Financial Expert?,
HIGHBEAM RES. (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lP3-803023431.html/print; see
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auditor, undertaking the ACFE responsibilities, must keep up with
new pronouncements and other unfolding developments to maintain
relevancy." 89 The majority of those commenting who thought that the
proposed definition of financial expert was too restrictive focused on
this attribute. The SEC was convinced by the weight of the comments
that the proposed requirement that an expert have direct experience
preparing or auditing financial statements could impose an undue bur-
den on some companies, especially smaller companies that desire to
have an ACFE.
VI. WHAT ABOUT INVESTMENT BANKERS, VENTURE CAPITALISTS,
AND PROFESSIONAL FINANCIAL ANALYSTS?
May investment bankers, venture capitalists, and professional finan-
cial analysts qualify as ACFEs? The SEC was persuaded by com-
menters' arguments that persons who have experience performing in-
depth analysis and evaluation of financial statements should not be
precluded from being able to qualify as ACFEs if they possess the
other four necessary attributes of an expert.90 The SEC, therefore,
"broadened this attribute by requiring an [ACFE] to have experience
preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial statements." 91
The SEC believes that its "revisions properly capture the clear in-
tent of the statute that an [ACFE] must have experience actually
working directly and closely with financial statements in a way that
provides familiarity with the contents of financial statements and the
processes behind them."92 The SEC also states:
We also believe that our revisions appropriately broaden the group
of persons who are eligible to be [ACFEs]. We recognize that many
people actively engaged in industries such as investment banking
and venture capital investment have had significant direct and close
exposure to, and experience with, financial statements and related
processes. Similarly, professional financial analysts closely scrutinize
financial statements on a regular basis. Indeed, all of these types of
individuals often hold positions that require them to inspect finan-
cial statements with a healthy dose of skepticism. They therefore
also Urton Anderson et al., The Role of Reporting Incentives and Quantification in Auditors'
Evaluations of Earnings Fluctuations 1 (July 12, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=276570 ("To the extent that the auditor fails to appropriately eval-
uate management-provided information, the effectiveness of the audit and the quality of earn-
ings may be compromised.").
89. Beresford & Hinsey, supra note 88, at 3.
90. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 5,110, 5,114 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 249).
91. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id.
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would be well prepared to diligently and zealously question man-
agement and the company's auditor about the company's financial
statements. Effective audit committee members must have both the
ability and the determination to ask the right questions. Therefore,
we have broadened this attribute to include persons with experience
performing extensive financial statement analysis or evaluation.93
VII. WHAT ABOUT SMALLER COMPANIES?
The new disclosure items effective March 31, 2003, "affect issuers
that are small entities." 94 Accordingly:
Exchange Act Rule 0-10(a) defines an issuer, other than an invest-
ment company, to be a "small business" or "small organization" if it
had total assets of $5 million or less on the last day of its most recent
fiscal year. We estimate that there are approximately 2,500 issuers,
other than investment companies, that may be considered small en-
tities. The new disclosure items apply to any small entity that is
subject to Exchange Act reporting requirements. 95
Recognizing that smaller companies have fewer resources available
to devote to cost effective regulatory compliance, the SEC has con-
vened its Forum on Small Business Capital Formation annually since
1982.96 In his opening remarks to the 2010 Forum, SEC Commis-
sioner Troy A. Paredes observes:
Smaller companies also face distinct challenges and hurdles, some
of which are rooted in regulatory requirements that can unduly bur-
den small business. The out-of-pocket financial cost of complying
with regulatory obligations can be difficult to bear. In addition, reg-
ulatory compliance requires a commitment of time and effort that
otherwise could be dedicated to running the business; smaller enter-
prises may not have excess human resources to distract from day-to-
day operations. Put simply, the disproportionate strain of regula-
tion on small business can create a barrier to entry or expansion. It
is important to keep this in mind during our rulemaking because
more established firms might not resist regulatory demands that
they can bear but that the larger firms' smaller competitors cannot
similarly shoulder ....
The practical challenge for securities regulators is to strike a bal-
ance that avoids unduly stifling the formation and fostering of new
and smaller businesses. Drawing appropriate regulatory distinc-
tions-such as between smaller and larger firms-and scaling regu-
93. Id. at 5,114-15.
94. Id. at 5,124.
95. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 5,124 (footnote omitted).
96. See generally 2010 Annual SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital
Formation, U.S. SEc. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/gbfor29.pdf.
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latory demands accordingly helps strike this balance by guarding
against overburdening enterprises that do not present the kinds of
concerns that, on balance, may warrant more costly regulation and
for which the costs of regulation may prove to be
disproportionate. 97
VIII. FINANCIAL EXPERT SUCCESSION PLANNING
A. Best Practice
It may take a highly skilled and experienced financial expert several
accounting cycles-several years-to become familiar with company-
specific issues relevant to audit committee oversight. The Business
Roundtable, in its most recently published Principles of Corporate
Governance, highlights the need for thoughtful attention to planning
for needed backgrounds and experience in board composition. Ac-
cordingly, in its discussion of "How the Board Performs Its Oversight
Function," the Business Roundtable observed:
As part of the ongoing assessment of board composition, the
board should plan ahead for the nomination of new directors by
engaging in succession planning. The board should conduct a for-
ward-looking assessment to identify qualifications and attributes
that the board may find valuable in the future based on the corpora-
tion's strategic plans, anticipated director retirements and evolving
best practices in the corporation's industry. The board also should
plan ahead for director departures, considering whether it is appro-
priate to establish or maintain procedures for the retirement or re-
placement of board members, such as a mandatory retirement age
or term limits.98
B. Who Will Govern Information Technology?
Few operational areas that may fall under the responsibility of the
audit committee present as much inherent risk or prove as difficult to
govern as IT. Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price have observed:
* IT failures include loss of sensitive and private customer infor-
mation; loss of sensitive product or financial data of the corpora-
tion; virus attacks by hackers on the company's computer
systems and those of its customers or vendors; business interrup-
tion losses due to IT downtime; as well as theft and use of client
credit card data.
* The average loss from a corporate security breach is $234,000.
* When public companies announce a breach, it typically causes a
five percent drop in share price.
97. Id. at 11-12.
98. Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at 14.
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* A number of cybersecurity bills have been introduced in
Congress.
* At least half of data breaches or losses are believed to be caused
by a lack of internal controls and process-not hackers or
viruses.
... Boards and executive management need to extend govern-
ance, already exercised over the enterprise, to IT by way of an ef-
fective IT governance framework. This framework should address
strategic alignment, performance measurement, risk management,
value delivery, and resource management. IT governance is an inte-
gral part of enterprise governance and consists of the leadership and
organizational structures and processes that ensure that the organi-
zation's IT sustains and extends the organization's strategies and
objectives. Simply put, IT governance and the effective application
of an IT governance framework are the responsibilities of the board
of directors and executive management.99
Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price contend that responsible best
practice "will dictate that an audit committee include IT expertise and
be composed of a qualified vice chairman, familiar with the company's
particular audit issues by virtue of experience gained from audit com-
mittee service. This will help provide an instant replacement for the
committee chair should unexpected developments require."100 In ad-
dition, Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price recommend that every
board should attempt to have at least two qualified financial experts
on their audit committee and "seek IT expertise and experience in
director recruitment to help avoid and address the costly private and
regulatory lawsuits related to cyber issues."10'
C. Optimizing the Financial Expert Search
Board composition and the dynamics of small group decision mak-
ing play a major role in the effectiveness of any committee. Professor
Seletha R. Butler observes that "[a] key challenge for board composi-
tion is building a group that can work cohesively, offer constructive
dissent, leverage each member's experience to better understand
tough issues, ask thought-provoking questions, demand pertinent in-
formation, and make the best informed decisions, while consistently
adding value." 102 Great functioning boards reflect more than just
99. Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board's Responsibility for Infor-
mation Technology Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFo. L. 313, 339-40 (2011)
(footnotes omitted).
100. Id. at 340.
101. Id. at 341; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board's Responsibility for
Director Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. Bus. REV. 75 (2012).
102. Seletha R. Butler, All on Board! Strategies for Constructing Diverse Boards of Directors,
7 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 61, 70 (2012).
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technical skills; diversity of thought and personal experiences are re-
quired, along with the ability to respect and work well with others.
"One-third of our board searches are for [ACFEs]," says Theodore L.
Dysart, Vice Chairman of Heidrick & Struggles, a Chicago-based ex-
ecutive search firm.103 "Those who technically qualify are relatively
easy to find-every public company CEO; retired major accounting
firm senior executives; and most chief financial officers and control-
lers meet the technical requirements."104 He continues:
The challenge is to find those qualified candidates who will make a
great board member; those with industry experience at the proper
level and also bring the right perspective, stature and presence-
and will be able to meaningfully contribute to the future strategy of
the enterprise. Following [SOX], best practice seems to call for the
new financial expert director to serve on the audit committee for a
year or two in order to provide for orderly succession planning
105
IX. CONCLUSION
During recent years, heightened standards for board audit commit-
tee membership have been imposed by the SEC, NYSE, and others.
SOX requires that the audit committee be comprised solely of inde-
pendent directors and that the company disclose whether at least one
of the members of the audit committee is a financial expert and if not,
why not. An ACFE is defined as a person who has the following at-
tributes: (1) an understanding of GAAP and financial statements; (2)
the ability to assess the general application of GAAP in connection
with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves; (3) the expe-
rience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial state-
ments that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting
issues that are generally comparable to the breadth and complexity of
issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised by the registrant's
financial statements, or experience actively supervising one or more
persons engaged in such activities; (4) an understanding of internal
controls and procedures for financial reporting; and (5) an under-
standing of audit committee functions.
Many seasoned audit committee chairmen hold the view that AC-
FEs should be experienced in performing financial accounting func-
tions themselves rather than simply have supervisory experience over
the function. Indicative of this view is that if accounting is the lan-
103. Trautman, supra note 101, at 101 (quoting Telephone Interview with Theodore L. Dysart,
Vice Chairman, Heidrick & Struggles (July 14, 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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guage of business, an ACFE needs to fluently "speak GAAP and
GAAS"10 to understand the nuances of sophisticated and complex
accounting, auditing, internal controls, and SEC regulations. Deter-
mining who qualifies as a financial expert is a fact-dependent, practi-
cal question that must be answered by every board, governance and
nominating committee, and audit committee member.
106. E-Mail from Dennis R. Beresford, supra note 86.
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